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RESEARCH ARTICLE 
Drivers of Firm Formalization in Vietnam: An Attention Theory Explanation 
 
Abstract 
Informal enterprises are widely viewed as a mechanism to engage unemployed people in the economy 
and thereby alleviate poverty in developing economies. However, over-representation in an economy 
may lead to both economic growth and broader employment opportunities being sacrificed. This 
paper presents a process model to investigate three potential drivers for firms to formalize: the first 
from a desire to grow and develop the firm through innovation; the second from the wish to access 
government financial support; and the third stimulated by the payment of unofficial payments or 
bribes. We use data from surveys of Vietnamese firms in 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011 to investigate 
these drivers of formalization. Although we find support for all three of these drivers, the results differ 
in significance across years and firm types. We explain these differences using attention theory to 
show how different situations and events can make the formalization decision more likely over time. 
 
Keywords: Formalization; informal economy; government support; innovation; corruption; attention 
theory 
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The informal economy is a significant part of economic activity in emerging economies (Hart 
1973; Levenson and Maloney 1998). This unlisted sector of the economy that does not always comply 
with government regulations (Loayza 1997), accounts for over 36 percent of GDP in developing 
economies, as compared to 14 percent for OECD nations (Schneider 2007). The contribution that 
informal firms make in alleviating unemployment has been well-recognised (Jackle and Li 2006). 
Indeed, authors such as Pisani and Patrick (2002) argue that bolstering this sector may have positive 
socio-economic outcomes for developing economies. The efficiency of these firms’ use of capital, 
resulting from their lack of the cost structures of employment and business processes associated with 
formalized firms, means that they are considered important for the survival of the desperate poor 
(Gërxhani 2004). 
However, the informal sector is also characterized by limited growth, low probability of 
survival, lower productivity, reduced technical efficiency, and limited access to credit markets, 
government services and legal institutions (Henley, Arabsheibani and Carneiro, 2009; Hernández-
Trillo, Pagán and Paxton, 2005:). In Vietnam, where this study takes place, researchers have identified 
increased profits and investments, coupled with a decrease in the use of casual labor as firms have 
formalized; concluding that formalization is beneficial both to firms and their workers (Rand and 
Torm, 2012). Therefore, over-representation of this sector in a developing economy, where 
government and financial institutions are becoming more transparent, efficient and reliable (Hakkala 
and Kokko, 2007), may hamper economic growth. As a result, governments in developing economies 
focus on removing the transition barriers for informal firms and encourage them to move to the 
formalized economy. Formalization provides these firms with benefits, such as better access to 
finance and government services, contract enforcement, and increases in customer-visibility and profit 
(Nugent and Sukiassyan, 2009; McKenzie and Sakho 2010). It also benefits employees because 
formalization invariably improves employment conditions (Galiani and Weinschelbaum 2012; 
Henley, et al. 2009). For governments, formalization increases tax revenues. Therefore, informality 
should be considered as a stage in the journey of a firm in a developing economy, with transition to 
the formalized economy (formalization) and growth as potentially the next stage (Bennett 2010; 
Coolidge and Ilic 2009).  
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The factors that promote the transition to formalization are therefore of interest to policy 
makers in emerging economies. To this end, there has been much focus on the investigation of the 
nature and determinants of informality (e.g., Smallbone and Welter 2012; Williams and Nadin 2012). 
The purpose is to help policymakers to design programs and policies that promote the transition of 
informal to formalized firms. However, research into the antecedents of the transition process is less 
understood, especially in Asian countries where the informal economy is not fully comparable to 
Latin American, Africa or other developing or transitioning economies (Jackle and Li 2006; Nugent 
and Sukiassyan 2009a, 2009b). Therefore, research that explains the reasons why informal firms 
transition to the formalized small and medium enterprise (SME) economy in Vietnam is timely.  
In this study, we use panel data from government surveys of Vietnamese firms in 2005, 2007, 
2009 and 2011 to understand why some firms transition from the informal to formalized economy. 
While obtaining data on the informal economy is notoriously difficult, our data allow us to propose 
three drivers that may motivate informal firms to formalize: first, informal firms are motivated to 
build capabilities to grow by introducing innovative products or processes; second, firms may seek 
improved access to government services; and third, informal firms that have been exposed to the dark 
side of the informal economy, marked by bribery, are motivated to formalize as a means to avoid it. 
The first part of this paper summarizes the related literature while the second part presents a model of 
the determinants of the transitioning process, based on data from Vietnamese firms. The paper 
concludes by highlighting implications such as the impact of government support on finance, 
innovation, and corruption on the transition process. We suggest that the supporting policies should 
change their focus to reducing corruption in order to support firm formalization.  
 
Background 
Our first contribution is theoretical. We focus on the drivers that motivate firms to formalize, 
rather than issues facing firms that choose to remain informal (e.g.,Thornton et al. 2010). While 
governments in developing economies do not want to discourage the creation of informal firms 
(McPherson and Liedholm 1996), it is also important that a substantial amount of these firms 
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formalize eventually (Loayza, Oviedo, and Servén 2005; Porta and Shleifer 2008). Yet, an 
understanding of the factors that underpin such a transition remains elusive (Rand and Tarp 2012). 
The overwhelming majority of existing publications are based on cross-sectional data (Dabla-
Norris, Gradstein, and Inchauste 2008; Jackle and Li 2006; Nugent and Sukiassyan 2009a, 2009b; 
Porta and Shleifer 2008, 2011), and therefore tend to compare informal and formalized firms without 
examining the factors that lead to formalization. These researchers acknowledge that access to firms 
that have transitioned is complicated, and that consequently many findings remain conjecture (Porta 
and Shleifer 2008). Therefore, much of the model development that is presented in the next section is 
based on research that has examined determinants of informality such as tax evasion or access to 
government services (Coolidge and Ilic 2009; Levenson and Maloney 1998; Paula and Scheinkman 
2007). Our means of understanding the decision to formalize is attention theory (Occasio 1997; Scott 
1992), which also informs the development of the hypotheses in the model. Our purpose is to show 
that firms shift attention as changes occur within in the firm itself, and with its relationship with 
external actors over time, both of which makes it more likely for formalization to occur. 
Researchers who explain why informal firms formalize have been restricted by the invisibility 
of, and/or low research access to, informal firms. Those that gained access (e.g., Dabla-Norris, 
Gradstein, and Inchauste2008; Jackle and Li 2006; Nugent and Sukiassyan 2009a; 2009b; Porta and 
Shleifer 2011; Schneider 2007) typically focus on micro firms with fewer than 10 employees. For 
example, the data in Jackle and Li (2006) comes from micro enterprises in Peru. The data in Dabla-
Norris, Gradstein and Inchauste comes from China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Russia, while Nugent 
and Sukiassyan (2009a) use data from micro firms in Mexico. From a methods point of view, our 
second contribution is therefore also to include SMEs more broadly in our analysis.  
Coupled with this, the third contribution of this paper arises from our extending the research 
beyond non-formalized economies in South America, Africa and East Europe. By focusing on 
Vietnam, we move this research into South East Asia, which has recently experienced rapid economic 
development. GDP in Vietnam has expanded at around six percent per annum since 2008, indicating a 
country which is fast becoming an important player in the subcontinent. The Vietnamese context is 
interesting, with policy makers tolerating informal firms; gently encouraging formalization by making 
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it attractive to do so, thereby signaling the institutionally acceptable choice (Tonoyan, Strohmeyer, 
Habib and Perlitz, 2010) rather than punishing firms that provide a living to owners who could 
alternatively be unemployed. To this extent, the Vietnamese government has introduced a range of 
policies to reduce the number of compliance procedures, as well as the time and costs of enterprise 
registration between 2003 and 2013, which spans the period of our four surveys. This has led to a 
decrease in procedures from 12 to ten, in registration time from 59 days to 34 days and in cost of 
registration from 31.9 percent to 7.7 percent of gross national income per capita (World Bank, 2014). 
In addition, the longitudinal dataset behind our investigation is also unique to this setting, as we 
describe in our methods section.  
Vietnamese firms can be registered at two levels, namely district level and provincial level. 
Firms that register at district level are called household firms. This type of registration is less onerous 
and, for practical and legal purposes, these firms are categorized as informal firms. While these 
registered informal forms are known to local government, their business operations are very much in 
the shadow economy. The household firms in our sample have no status as a legal entity and are not 
required to pay employee insurance. There is no corporate tax requirement and while business owners 
are supposed to pay income tax, in practice the tax taken from these firms is almost zero. Therefore, 
similar to the definition of Webb, Bruton, Tihanyi and Ireland (2013, p. 598), these firms’ activities 
are “technically illegal yet are not antisocial in intent”. In contrast, firms that register at the provincial 
level and operate under Enterprise Law (Nguyen 2005) or Cooperative Law (Nguyen 2003) are 
considered to be formalized firms. Formalized firms include limited liability firms, joint stock 
companies, cooperatives, partnerships and private firms. Currently, around four million individual 
business households are registered in district registration agencies (GSO 2010) while there are 
600,000 registered enterprises (MPI 2011) at a provincial registration level. 
To facilitate movement to the formalized economy, the Vietnamese government has 
introduced several support programs for entrepreneurs. For example, Enterprise Law covers the entry 
process of new formal firms and provides tax credits and tax exemption for these firms over a certain 
period; the Credit Guarantee Fund covers the loan application of small and medium enterprises. 
However, the informal economy still accounts for a significant part of Vietnamese GDP 
Page 5 of 31
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/tepn
Entrepreneurship & Regional Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
6 
 
(Razafindrakoto, Roubaud, and Duy Van 2008; Schneider 2007), which is estimated to be around 20 
percent of national accounts (Cling, Razafindrakoto, and Roubaud 2011). In addition, the proportion 
of informal employment in non-farm sectors has remained persistently high in recent years (47.1 
percent in 2007, 68.1 percent in 2009 and 67.2 percent in 2013) (Cling, Razafindrakoto, and Roubaud 
2011; ILO 2013; Le 2014), which further makes this an ideal location for our research. 
 
A Model of Firm Formalization 
This research proposes a model that explains the conditions that enable or drive informal 
firms to transition to the formalized economy. To this end, a number of hypotheses are presented. Our 
model is predicated on the assumption that informality is not costless. Loayza (1997) identifies a 
number of pecuniary costs, including those associated with penalties, a lack of access to government 
services, and a lack of legal protection. Avoiding these costs is what drives informal firms to 
eventually formalize. We extend this research (Scheinkman2007) to include not only government 
support, but also the role of innovation and bribes or corruption, while controlling for firm size, age, 
industry sector and location. 
However, cost-avoidance alone is not a sufficient catalyst for formalization. Owners of these 
firms must also pay attention to the costs arising from the decision to be informal or formal, and this 
attention is influenced by interrelated cognitive and institutional factors. Occasio (1997) describes 
three interrelated types of attention that are relevant to the following model of formalization. What 
decision-makers do depends on the issues they focus upon (focus of attention), but this focus depends 
on the context in which they find themselves (situated attention). At a broader level, these two forms 
of attention depend on the rules of the institutions and relationships in which decision-makers find 
themselves (structural distribution of attention). Consequently, these forms of attention motivate 
decision-makers to take action on formalization, but act through different levels of analysis 
(Kahneman, 1973; Occasio, 1997; Simon 1957). 
This model implies that the decision to formalize depends on processes of change within the 
firm’s position within the broader industry network (Steen and Liesch, 2007; Axelsson and Easton, 
1992). As shifts occur in external relationships, which change the structural distribution of attention, 
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the focus of attention on the costs of informality will change over time, making it more likely that the 
decision to formalize will occur. Similarly, changes within the business caused by growth may 
redirect situated attention to the costs of informality and, if successive events attract attention to these 
costs, then it is likely that a formalization decision will be the end result. 
 
The Cost of Access to Government Financial Support 
Governments develop policies and programs that support the establishment and development 
of SMEs, including informal firms (McQuaid 2002). There are several types of government-supported 
measures for SMEs, such as developing managerial expertise including business and marketing 
strategies, market research, advertising, public relations, product or service design, new technology, 
computer services, personnel and recruitment, taxation and finance (Bennett and Robson 2003). Most 
of these programs target formal firms rather than their informal counterparts (Loayza 1997). 
Therefore, informal firms tend to have less access to government support programs than formalized 
firms, and may even actively avoid accessing such programs to avoid taxation and regulation. This is 
confirmed by Levenson and Maloney (1998) and De Paula and Scheinkman (2007), who find that 
formalized firms are more likely to access government contracts than informal firms. Although a 
government contract is only an indirect form of support, informal firms clearly find it difficult to 
obtain this type of assistance. 
In addition, because of illegal activities such as tax evasion, informal firms rarely take full 
advantage of government support, especially if provided through the legal, judicial and security 
system (Loayza 1997). Because informal firms often view such illegal activities as beneficial, they are 
discouraged from formalizing in that accessing government support may lead to prosecution. In some 
instances where business owners do not accept the legitimacy of government, the informal economy 
can become entrenched in society (Richardson and Pisani, 2012). These owners therefore remain 
invisible to governments and their support programs. In Vietnam, informal firms can access some 
forms of government support such as human resource training or soft loans. However, access to these 
is limited because most supporting policies target formalized firms. Informal firms are restricted from 
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accessing such support because they lack a viable accounting system (account books) and other 
regulatory documents (CIEM 2007, 2008, 2010).  
From a firm perspective, literature evidence on the effect of government support is 
contradictory. Most government support programs for the informal economy target individuals rather 
than firms, which does not encourage informal firms to formalize and thereby benefit from support 
programs (Paula and Scheinkman 2007). However, informal firms are more likely to register as 
formal firms if the benefits of formalization such as tax incentives, soft loans, and government support 
for human resource development and technology are greater than the costs such as registration fees, 
and other payments occurred during the registration process. Coolidge (2009) agrees and argues that 
one of the most important reasons why firms formalize is to gain better access to government services. 
Therefore, early exposure to some forms of government support, coupled with anecdotal evidence 
from other firms that have received such support, may strengthen the resolve of firms to formalize. In 
other words, the structural distribution of attention is most important in the effect of government 
support on the probability of formalization. Engaging firms in the structural institutions of the 
formalized economy shifts their attention from the benefits of being informal to the costs of not being 
formalized (Prahalad, 2004). Eventually, as Hansen et al. (2009) and Fajnzylber et al. (2009) explain, 
firms that receive government financial support have higher growth rates than non-receivers. The 
effect of such a change may take time to manifest through the connection to multiple institutions and 
the consequent focus of attention on the costs of informality, which means that we need to build a lag 
effect into our model. Overall, these processes of shifting attention to costs make it more probable that 
a formalization decision will occur. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
H1: Government financial support in the previous period will be positively associated with 
formalization in the current period 
 
The Cost of Corruption  
Corruption is a major problem in the informal economy (Friedman et al. 2000). In our dataset, 
we consider corruption to be in the form of unofficial payments or bribes, which could therefore not 
be integrated into official accounts (Rand and Tarp 2012). The relationship between informality and 
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corruption was first identified by De Soto (1989) who found that, in most cases, the detection of 
informal enterprises is accompanied by some form of corruption. In fact, in developing economies, 
informal firms can incur bribes of up to 20 percent of their revenue (Djankov et al. 2002). At the 
macro level, Friedman et al. (2000) suggest that countries with more corruption have a higher share of 
the unofficial or informal economy; firm level data in Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and 
Ukraine confirm this argument (Johnson et al. 2000). This research investigates the relationship 
between the under-reporting of sales and the bribing of officials to find that firms have incentives to 
hide their activities to reduce the unofficial payments that they have to pay and to also evade tax. 
More recently, in their study of the informal economy in 41 countries, Dabla-Norris, Gradstein and 
Inchauste (2008) again confirm the positive correlation between corruption and informality. 
Therefore, at both macro and micro levels, paying bribes is positively associated with hidden 
economic activities (Dreher and Schneider 2010). 
However, less research focuses on this relationship in firms that are transitioning between the 
informal and formalized economy. Using cross-sectional regression analysis to investigate 394 
informal firms not paying bribes in the 2005 survey of Vietnamese SMEs, Rand and Tarp (2012) 
show that the probability of paying bribes is relatively low when a firm is informal, while the 
probability of paying bribes by transitioning firms is higher than those remaining informal. These 
authors argue that formalizing firms become more visible, which could potentially increase the 
probability of paying bribes. 
Nevertheless, based on Misati (2010), who shows that corruption in the shadow economy can 
indeed push firms into the formal economy and the lagged effects built into our model, we disagree. 
The lack of legal instruments and weak regulation compliance in developing countries could result in 
a higher share of bribe payments by the informal economy. In the case where improvements have 
been made in public sector institutions, formalization and engagement with official institutions may 
afford more protection from bribery. We therefore argue that firms will be more likely to formalize if 
they have previously been exposed to these forms of corruption in an attempt to avoid it in future. 
Payment of bribes imposes a cost on the firm and creates situated attention of these costs. We argue 
that situated attention is more important in this instance because the personal impact and loss of 
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income will be felt most acutely by the owner of the firm. When these costs are great enough and 
accrued over time, firms will formalize to avoid these costs. Therefore, it is proposed that: 
H2: Payment of bribes in the previous period will be positively associated with formalization in the 
current period 
 
Innovation and the Cost of Missed Growth Opportunities 
Inspired by Schumpeter (1912, 1917), the definition of innovation is widely debated while, as 
a concept, it is widely studied (Acs 1988; Freeman1982; Rothwell and Zegveld 1985). However, in 
this research, we use the most commonly used classification of innovation provided by the OECD 
(2005), namely, that innovation involves the introduction of either new or significantly improved 
goods, services or process, or a new marketing or organizational method. 
We view innovation as a catalyst for formalization because it directs an owner’s situated 
attention on the potential for lost opportunities, arguing that informal firms are limited in their ability 
to grow and capitalize on new business options. Remaining informal can hamper growth, as the 
choice of technology and access to finance is curtailed (Mole et al. 2004). In addition, because of sub-
standard working conditions, non-formalized firms may not attract educated workers, and thus have 
less incentive to invest in training and other learning activities (Perry et al. 2007). Consequently, 
informal firms are less likely to continually innovate than their formal counterparts. 
While limited research investigates the relationship between formalization and innovation, we 
argue that those informal firms that innovate are more likely to formalize to ensure easier access to 
loans via the broader network of banking institutions. Innovation may also facilitate formalized firms 
receiving subsidies from government to meet the increasing demand of capital, market and human 
resource for innovation implementation. Indeed, as the situated attention focuses on the potential for 
lost opportunities, structural attention on formalization is reinforced through the institutions of the 
formalized economy. As attention shifts over time from the costs to the benefits of formalization, 
motivation for formalization will ensue, thus increasing the likelihood of the transition to the 
formalized economy. It is therefore proposed that: 
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H3: Innovation in the previous period has a positive relationship with firm formalization in the 
current period. 
 
Research Method 
Sample 
This research uses data from the “Small and Medium Scale Enterprise Survey in Vietnam” 
conducted in 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011 as a collaboration between the Institute of Labor Science and 
Social Affairs, the Central Institute for Economic Management, and the Department of Economics of 
the University of Copenhagen under the Business Sector Support Programs, which was sponsored by 
Danish International Development Agency. The four surveys covered around 2,600 manufacturing 
firms in three cities in each of the four years, namely Hochiminh City, Hanoi, Haiphong and seven 
rural provinces, namely Nghean, Longan, Hatay, Quangnam, Phutho, Khanhhoa and Lamdong (see 
Figure 2). In each survey, a stratified sampling method was employed to ensure representativeness 
across all types of enterprises. Therefore, the sample from the four surveys included both firms 
operating under Enterprise Law and Cooperative Law (Nguyen 2003, 2005), which are considered as 
formalized firms, as well as household firms that do not operate under these laws (Nguyen 2003, 
2005), which are considered to be informal firms. The number and locations of the total population of 
interviewed firms are described in Appendices 1 and 2. The response rate was nearly 98 percent 
across surveys, which is typical for surveys in Vietnam where firms are expected to participate in data 
collection aimed at improving policy outcomes. Because of the high response rate, no tests for 
response bias were conducted. After data cleaning and checking the consistency of time-invariant 
variables between the four survey rounds, we were left with a panel of 1,023 firms that were informal 
in 2005. Most of these firms employed fewer than 20 employees, as shown on Figure 1. In this study, 
we followed these informal firms to see if they had transitioned to become formalized firms, and if so, 
what conditions supported the change. 
Figures 1 and 2 here 
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Variables 
Our hypotheses identified one dependent variable, three explanatory variables, and four control 
variables, as summarized in the Appendix 3 and briefly explained next. 
In the database, the unique dependent variable in our model was ‘Formalization’, representing 
a change in the legal status of informal firms from one period to the next. If firms changed from 
informal to formal, the 'Formalization' variable was assigned a value of 1 and, if firms did not change 
from informal to formal, the value was zero. 
The three explanatory variables in this study were government financial support, corruption 
and innovation. If firms had received government support in terms of tax credits, tax exemption or 
reduction, or policy lending or soft loans from the Vietnam Development Bank or Vietnam Bank for 
Social Policy, they were regarded as having received government financial support 
(GOVERNMENT). The second explanatory variable was the total amount paid as bribes or unofficial 
payments (CORRUPTION). In addition, firms were regarded to innovate if they declared the 
introduction of a new product, new technology or processes improving current products 
(INNOVATION). A Wald test indicated that the covariates in our regression model were appropriate, 
with at least one having an effect that is not equal to zero. 
We further included four control variables that have been shown to be important in studies 
like this, namely firm growth, firm age, firm location and industry. Firm growth was measured as 
growth of total employee numbers, including casual, part-time and full-time staff. Firm age was 
measured by the number of years in business. Firm performance was calculated by the ratio of sales 
on assets. Firms’ locations were categorized as urban (Hanoi, Haiphong, and Hochiminh City) or rural 
(Hatay, Phutho, Nghean, Lamdong, Khanhoa, Quangnam, and Longan). Industry was classified into 
low technology, medium low technology, medium high technology and high technology industries 
based on the OECD definition (OECD 2009) as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 here 
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Regression Models 
As the variable representing formalization is a binary variable and the total proportion of 
transitioned firms was only around ten percent, rare-event logistic regression models (King and Zeng 
2001) are used to test the relationship between formalization and government financial support, 
corruption and innovation. This method allows us to achieve unbiased estimates and, although these 
results mirrored logistic regression results well, we report the more accurate estimates of rare-event 
logit regression here. Our models, based on the hypotheses shown earlier, are as follows: 
Prob(FORMALIZATION=1) = = 


	

 
whereβ is the bias - estimated of β 
Model1: Log (


) = β  0 + β1GOVERNMENT + β 2CORRUPTION + β 3INNOVATION + εi,, 
Model 2: Log (




) = β0 + β 1GOVERNMENT + β

2 CORRUPTION + β

3INNOVATION + 
β4GROWTH+ β

5SIZE + β

6PERFORMANCE+ β

7LOCATION  +  β 8LOW_TECHNOLOGY+ 
β 9MED_LOW_TECHNOLOGY + β 10MED_HIGH_TECHNOLOGY + β 11YEAR2007 
+β 12YEAR2009 εi,, 
where is the probability that a firm transitions to being a formalized firm. 
Further, to ensure that there was no multi-collinearity among independent variables, VIF 
values were examined. The results (Appendix 4) show that these values range between1.00 and 
1.45;all within acceptable limits. 
 
Results 
During the period of the four surveys, around five percent of informal firms transitioned from 
informal to formal, as summarized in Table 2. As Elgin (2010) shows, using panel data from 152 
countries, transitions are economically counter-cyclical, with greater numbers formalizing before the 
effects of the global financial crisis (GFC) than after. In our sample, firms that formalized generally 
received less government financial support than firms that remained informal. Formalized firms also 
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tended to be larger, older, more innovative, and more likely to pay bribes before formalization, and 
more likely to be located in urban areas. These results are shown in Tables 3. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Tables 3here 
 
Table 4 summarizes the main relationships between the variables studied here. An overview 
of these relationships highlights that a number of them are interesting. In addition to the patterns 
identified above, we also saw that government financial support was positively related to corruption. 
Government financial support was also negatively associated with firms operating in medium-low 
industries, more likely to be paid to rural firms, and younger firms tended to be more likely to have 
government financial support. Innovation coincided with the payment of bribes and tended to occur in 
older firms. Moreover, corruption was more likely to be associated with urban firms. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
Table 5here 
 
H1 was first explored using correlations, and then tested using rare-event logistic regression. 
A positive relationship was found between government financial support and the probability of 
transition to the formalized economy, taking into account a lag of one period (two years), which 
means that firms receiving this type of support in the previous period were more likely to formalize 
than those that did not receive support. Hence, H1 was accepted. 
Following a similar procedure for H2 and H3, we found both that firms that remained 
informal tended to pay bribes/unofficial payments more than firms that formalized, and that the 
relationships were significant. Therefore, our hypotheses that the payment of bribes or other unofficial 
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payments supported formalization were accepted. H3 was accepted because regression results 
indicated that firms that introduced new technology or new products, or improved current products 
were significantly more likely to formalize.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The results supported the proposed relationship between government support and 
formalization in that government support for informal firms makes them more likely to formalize as 
structural attention drives decision-makers to consider the costs of informality and the benefits of 
operating in the formalized economy. Structural attention is enacted through a network of distributed 
actors in the broader economy and the institutions of the public sector (Simon, 1957). While the 
decision to formalize might be made by the owner of the firm, the attention on missed opportunities is 
enabled by the business becoming embedded within the network of people and processes that are part 
of the formalized economy. Government support draws firms into this network and shifts the attention 
of the owner to the costs of remaining informal. 
Findings regarding government support on finance in terms of tax credit, tax exemption or 
loans support are consistent with Hansen et al. (2009) and Fajnzylber et al. (2009). According to these 
authors, firms that receive government financial support grow faster than non-receivers. 
Consequently, informal firms are motivated to formalize to achieve higher growth. While Vietnamese 
firms can access support through investment incentives, tax exemptions or reductions, or soft loans 
from the Vietnam Development Bank or Vietnam Bank for Social Policy, only formalized firms can 
apply for investment incentives, tax exemptions or reductions. In contrast, informal firms could access 
only a small number of soft loans from the Vietnam Development Bank or the Vietnam Bank for 
Social Policy that focus on poverty alleviation rather than business development. Therefore, 
formalization underpins the importance of focused attention (Paula and Scheinkman 2007). In our 
Vietnamese data, both informal and formal firms paid bribes to deal with tax collectors and to become 
better connected to public services, which mean that bribes were paid to get things done. It also 
supports Welter’s (2012) assertion that trust of individuals precedes trust of institutions. This is a 
different conclusion from another study that suggested that Vietnamese firms paid bribes to hide from 
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the regulations and costs of the formalized economy (Rand and Tarp 2012). Informal firms that paid 
bribes were more likely to formalize during all the periods that we observed. The consistency of this 
result is important because it emphasizes the importance of situated attention throughout the 
immediate environment in which businesses find themselves. Although structural attention that draws 
owners into the wider network of attention through interaction with formalized institutions clearly 
matters, it is reinforced and mediated through situated attention (Occasio 1997). 
Importantly, our results show that, when a time lag is built into the relationship, it solves 
some of the conflicting findings in previous studies (e.g., Dreher and Schneider 2010), which often 
indicate that, once firms became involved in the shadow economy, they feel compelled to remain 
‘invisible’. Situated attention may need to accumulate for some time before the owner feels compelled 
to act on the costs of being informal brought about by corruption and bribes. 
We must emphasize that our finding into the relationship between bribery and formalization 
needs to be understood in the context of Vietnam during the survey period between 2005 and 2011. 
Unlike other examples, such as de Soto’s (1989) Peru data where the costs of being in the formalized 
economy were persistently high (Bromley, 1990), reforms in Vietnam during our survey period 
lowered the cost of operating in the formalized economy (World Bank, 2014). This would explain the 
difference between our findings and those of Rand and Tarp (2012) who used 2005 cross sectional 
data and found that firms remained informal to hide from the costs of the formalized economy. 
Last, we found a positive significant relationship between innovation within informal 
businesses and the transition to formal status, which means that the informal firms that have either 
product or process innovation are more likely to transition to formal firms. The important role of 
innovation for profitable growth is stated in a range of studies (Schumpeter 1912, Thom 1990). 
Therefore, the structural attention shifts firms from the narrower network in the informal sector to a 
wider network of business and government institutions in the formalized sector. In addition, the time-
lag effect supports the notion that innovation does not directly draw the focus of attention to the costs 
of being informal. Rather the structural distribution of attention caused by connection to the 
institutions of the formalized economy gradually shifts the focus of attention to the costs of 
informality over time, making a formalization decision more likely. 
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Our study has some important limitations that should be considered. First, we were unable to 
distinguish between corruption and unofficial payments, which may partially affect our findings 
regarding the relationship between formalization and the cost of corruption. Second, we use data from 
a particular section of the informal Vietnamese economy and do not include the micro-firms that are 
completely invisible and virtually impossible to survey. 
This paper used data from a survey of Vietnamese firms to understand why informal firms 
transition in formalized firms. The results showed that this transition process benefits from 
government-supported finance. Such support encourages firms to enter the formalized economy rather 
than face the costs associated with remaining informal. In sum, government-financed support for 
businesses to transition to formalization can lead to two positive outcomes: first, in removing any 
growth constraints of individual businesses; and second, in enforcing the property rights of these 
businesses when they register and so gain the full benefits of accessing credit and skilled labor. Added 
to these positives can be that corruption in the economy reduces as participation in the formalized 
economy increases when those yet to transition acknowledge that the cost of being informal is greater 
than the cost of being formal. This formalization ‘equation’ is subjectively evaluated by business 
owners and affected by attention bias. 
 Last, our results also emphasize the importance of supporting innovation in all types of firms. 
Innovation most likely drives the probability of transition through both situated attention (focusing 
attention on growth) and structural attention (innovative firms are drawn into the network of other 
instructions), both of which draw attention to the benefits of being part of the formalized economy. 
Therefore, locating and engaging with innovative businesses should be a potent lever for governments 
to transition them into the formalized economy. 
Theoretically, these results are consistent with an attention-theory perspective on the decision 
to formalize (Occasio 1995, Occasio, 1997). Changes within the business and the relationships with 
external actors over time shift the focus of attention thus making it more likely for a business owner to 
formalize their business. Taken together, these results suggest that pull-through policies that create 
structural attention on the formalized economy by creating better operating conditions for formal 
firms are more effective policy instruments in developing economies wanting to decrease their 
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reliance on the informal economy. Last, we call for a greater use of institutional perspectives to 
explain the transition to formalization. Although attention theory is one branch of institutional theory 
(Occasio 1997), modelling based on other theories may be highly useful to predict transition and 
guide policy makers in emerging economies. 
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FIGURE 
Figure 1: Size distribution of informal firms in the 2005 round survey 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Map of Vietnam and locations of interviewed firms 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Classification of technology 
Food and beverages  Low Technology 
Tobacco Low Technology 
Textiles Low Technology 
Apparel Low Technology 
Leather Low Technology 
Wood Low Technology 
Paper Low Technology 
Publishing and printing Low Technology 
Furniture, jewelry, music equipment, Low Technology 
Recycling Low Technology 
Rubber Medium Low Technology 
Non-metallic mineral products Medium Low Technology 
Basic metals Medium Low Technology 
Fabricated metal products Medium Low Technology 
Chemical products etc. Medium High Technology 
Motor vehicles etc. Medium High Technology 
Other transport equipment Medium High Technology 
Electronic machinery, computers, radio, High Technology 
Source: (OECD 2009) 
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Table 2: Informal firms that transition into formal 
 
Legal Status  2007 2009 2011 
Informal firms transition to formal 58 24 28 
 (5.7) (2.5) (3.0) 
Informal firms remain informal 965 941 913 
 (94.3) (97.5) (97.0) 
Total 1023 965 941 
 (100) (100) (100) 
(Percentage in parentheses)    
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive analyses for transitioned and non-transitioned firms 
  Transitioned 
panel 
Non-transitioned panel Balanced panel 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
GOVERNMENT 0.3909 0.4902 0.3012 0.4588 0.3045 0.44603 
CORRUPTION 0.4636 0.5010 0.2086 0.4064 0.2182 0.4131 
INNOVATION 0.6727 0.4714 0.4683 0.4991 0.4749 0.4995 
Firm Age 14.6818 7.9331 16.8911 9.8929 16.8081 9.8343 
Location 0.4636 0.5010 0.2462 0.4309 0.22544 0.4356 
Industry Low 0.3091 0.4642 0.6513 0.4766 0.6453 0.4785 
Industry MedLow 0.3455 0.4777 0.2394 0.4268 0.2434 0.4292 
Industry MedHigh 0.1273 0.3348 0.1004 0.3006 0.1014 0.3019 
Number of 
observations 
110 2,819 2,929 
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Table 4: Correlation matrices 
  
Forma-
lization 
GOVERN-
MENT 
CORRUP-
TION 
INNO-
VATION 
Firm 
Growth Firm Age 
Firm 
Location 
Industry 
Low 
Industry 
MedLow 
GOVERNMENT 0.0371**                 
CORRUPTION 0.1174*** 0.0402**               
INNOVATION 0.0778***  0.0319* 0.2067***             
Firm Growth 0.0429** -0.0052 -0.0601***  -0.0286           
Firm Age -0.0453** -0.0416** -0.0362* -0.0837*** -0.0530**         
Firm Location  0.0949*** -0.2315*** 0.1888***  0.0431** -0.0218 0.0041       
Industry Low -0.0637*** -0.0009 -0.0852***  -0.1922*** -0.0194 0.1485*** -0.0323*     
Industry MedLow  0.0470** -0.0348* 0.0644*** 0.1062*** 0.0160 -0.1190*** 0.0596*** -0.7650***   
Industry MedHigh  0.0169 0.0456** 0.0416** 0.1555*** 0.0061 -0.0766*** -0.0585*** -0.4531*** -0.1903*** 
Note: Spearman correlation, (* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01) 
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Table 5: Regression models (rare-event logistic regression) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Control variables     
FirmGrowth   0.1535*** 
  (3.59) 
Age  -0.0170 
  (-1.36) 
Location  0.9763*** 
  (4.54) 
Low Industry  -1.4049** 
  (-2.26) 
Med_Low Industry  -0.9562 
  (-1.52) 
Med_High Industry  -1.0791 
  (-1.57) 
Year2007  0.3693 
  (1.54) 
Year2009  -0.1198 
  (-0.40) 
Explanatory variables   
GOVERNMENT 0.3414* 0.5810*** 
 (1.71) (2.71) 
CORRUPTION 1.0288*** 0.7782*** 
 (4.94) (3.57) 
INNOVATION 0.6199*** 0.4577** 
 (2.83) (2.02) 
Constant -4.0349*** -3.1025*** 
 (-20.75) (-4.41) 
Number of observations 2929 2929 
(* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01) 
Z-value in parenthesis. 
Base: High technology industries, Year 2011 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Location of manufacturing firms (2011 data)  
  Household 
establishment 
Private/sole 
proprietorship 
Partnership/ 
Collective/ 
Cooperative 
Limited 
liability 
company 
Joint 
stock 
company 
Ha Noi 16,588 1,194 217 1,793 397 
Phu Tho 17,042 65 12 97 22 
Ha Tay 23,890 100 18 150 33 
Hai Phong 12,811 206 38 309 69 
Nghe An 22,695 125 23 187 41 
Quang Nam 10,509 51 9 76 17 
Khanh Hoa  5,603 119 22 178 39 
Lam Dong 5,268 75 14 112 25 
Hochiminh city 34,241 2,052 374 3,080 683 
Long An 8,050 83 15 124 27 
Sample total 156,697 4,068 741 6,107 1,354 
Source: CIEM (2012) 
 
Appendix 2: Number of Enterprises Interviewed per survey and location (all enterprises were 
privately held manufacturing firms) 
  Interviewed in 
2011  
Interviewed in 
2009  
Interviewed in 
2007 
Interviewed in 
2005 
Ha Noi 279 283 279 299 
PhuTho 257 258 242 276 
Ha Tay 371 376 381 395 
Hai Phong 208 210 194 204 
Nghe An 352 353 349 385 
Quang Nam 151 158 154 171 
Khanh Hoa 93 94 86 100 
Lam Dong 67 68 81 87 
Hochiminh city 603 616 602 693 
Long An 127 127 124 129 
Total 2,508 2,543 2,492 2,739 
Source: CIEM (2012) 
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Appendix 3: Independent variables 
Variables Explanation of dependent variables 
Formalization The dependent variable was represented a change in the legal status of 
informal firms in the database from one period to the next. If firms changed 
from informal to formal, the 'Formalization' variable was assigned a value of 
1 and, if firms did not change from informal to formal, the value was zero. 
GOVERNMENT Dummy variable. Government support through finance. If informal firms 
receive this type of support, Government finance=1, otherwise Government 
finance=0, collected in the previous survey round (n-1). 
CORRUPTION Amount of bribes and informal payments that a firm paid in year 2004, year 
2006, year 2008 and year 2010 in 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011 surveys 
respectively, collected in the previous survey round (n-1). 
INNOVATION Dummy variable. Innovation is measured by the probability of introducing 
new product, new technology or major improving current products. If firms 
reported innovation, INNOVATION=1, otherwise INNOVATION=0, 
collected in the previous survey round (n-1). 
FIRM GROWTH  The increase in number of total employee in firms in year 2006, year 2008 
and year 2010 in 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011 survey, respectively, based on 
current survey round. 
FIRM AGE Number of year in business at the end of year 2004, year 2006, year 2008 and 
year 2010 in 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011 survey, respectively, based on 
current survey round. 
LOCATION Dummy variable. The location of firms. If firms locate in Hanoi, Hochiminh 
city and Haiphong city, which are urban areas, LOCATION=1, otherwise 
LOCATION=0, based on 2011 data. 
LOW_INDUSTRY Dummy variable. LOW_INDUSTRY=1 if firm operating in medium low 
technology sector, otherwise LOW_INDUSTRY=0, collected on 2011 data. 
MED_LOW_ INDUSTRY Dummy variable. MED_LOW_INDUSTRY=1 if firm operating in medium 
high technology sector, otherwise MED_LOW_ INDUSTRY=0, based on 
2011 data. 
MED_HIGH_INDUSTRY Dummy variable. MED_HIGH_INDUSTRY=1 if firm operates in high 
technology sector, otherwise MED_HIGH_INDUSTRY=0, based on 2011 
data. 
YEAR2007 Dummy variable. YEAR2007=1 if the firms transition into formal in 2007 data, 
otherwise YEAR2007=0 
YEAR2009 Dummy variable. YEAR2009=1 if the firms transition into formal in 2009 data, 
otherwise YEAR2009=0 
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Appendix 4: VIF values 
Variable VIF  
GOVERNMENT 1.09 
CORRUPTION 1.11 
INNOVATION 1.15 
FIRM GROWTH 1.01 
FIRM AGE 1.05 
FIRM PERFORMANCE 1.01 
LOCATION 1.12 
LOW_INDUSTRY 23.65 
MED_LOW_ INDUSTRY 19.50 
MED_HIGH_INDUSTRY 10.24 
YEAR2007 1.49 
YEAR2009 1.39 
 
 
 
Appendix 5: Wald test 
LR chi2(12) = 88.25 
Prob> chi2 = 0.0000 
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